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Santos et al (2020) is an extremely interesting paper on the relationship between technology 
and work, examined in light of developments of AI, automation and robotics that point towards 
future scenarios where work might be superfluous. Specifically, on this background, the 
authors pose their provocative title-question ‘Should humans work?’ Their main message is 
that the issues surrounding this question have been muddled, mainly due to a failure to keep 
separate two aspects of the notion of work. The first aspect is what one might call the 
‘philosophical’ aspect – the one that involves ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ by providing meaning 
and purpose to people’s lives through their work. The second aspect is the ‘technical’ aspect, 
which concerns access to ‘basic goods’, and which roughly is equivalent to income-generating 
work. On the interpretation of the present commentary, Santos et al maintain that the confusion 
arising from the failure to keep the two aspects separate boils down to the following two-
pronged claim. First, while the philosophical aspect is obscure and belongs to the province of 
non-technical disciplines outside the authors’ concern, the technical aspect is: 
[A] question of how to produce and optimize access to goods, or basic needs, [and] is therefore 
a political question and a question of social structure and ultimately an engineering and 
technical task to be carried out, and not a question of “meaning”.  (p. 15, my emphasis) 
Second, and related, there is nothing fundamentally difficult about this technical question; in 
fact, they think that ‘an optimization algorithm’ could answer it (ibid.).  
In short, the authors think that the two aspects give rise to two kinds of question, a 
philosophical and a technical one, only the latter of which they address and give a 
straightforward answer to. Given this seemingly simple answer to the paper’s title-question, 
someone might wonder if a whole paper is needed to deal with it. Perhaps clarification of the 
involved terms can dispel this suspicion? 
 Now, Santos et al do not put much effort into defining the terms they use. Indeed, the 
paper only contains three explicit definitions, taken from Oxford Online Dictionaries: two of 
‘work’ and one of ‘technology’, all very brief (15, 11 and 8 words, respectively). Yet, these 
definitions are quite helpful to the reader. The first one of ‘work’ as human ‘activity involving 
mental or physical effort done in order to achieve purpose or result’ (p. 3) is particularly 
instructive. For it shows clearly what the authors are not – at least not explicitly – concerned 
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with. As they stress, they are not concerned with work in this general sense; specifically, this 
is not the notion of work that is involved in the title-question of the paper. Instead, they have 
in mind ‘work’ in a decidedly narrower sense, namely, work in the sense of their second 
definition: ‘a mental or physical activity as a means of earning income; employment’ (ibid.). 
They have different ways of expressing this distinction between meaning- and income-
generating work, but the most succinct one is between ‘work as meaning’ and ‘work as 
technicality’ (p. 9).1 
So far, so good for ‘work as meaning’, then. What about ‘work as technicality’? The 
authors view this income-related notion of work as intimately linked to the concept of ‘basic 
needs’. Despite using this latter concept frequently, they provide no definition of it, preferring 
instead to take it as understood (though they do cite Jolly 1976). Given how often they invoke 
it, however, it seems that they ought to have at least cited a substantial source of it. For instance, 
they could have mentioned Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943, 1954): Maslow’s two 
lowest levels of needs (physiological needs, safety needs) are often jointly known as ‘basic 
needs’. In any case, the authors seem to consider the basic-needs-oriented notion of work to be 
equivalent if not identical to the income-generating notion of work, and they therefore see it as 
just as clear and unproblematic. By contrast, they view the general sense of work as equivalent 
if not identical to ‘work as meaning’ and hence, to repeat, as obscure. However, they assume 
both views without argument. Clearly, arguments are called for, though. 
Fortunately, however, the paper has two features that greatly boost its value despite 
this. First, Santos et al conducted small surveys that had interesting results in the light of the 
theoretical part of the paper. Second, the paper prompts us to pose an important moral 
conundrum. 
Consider first the surveys. They were a survey of Facebook users (N=34) and one of 
Harvard graduate alumni (N=29). Their results demonstrate that the two aspects of work are 
present to different extents in the participants’ attitudes. Although the authors made clear that 
they only refer to income-generating work in their questions to participants, ‘it was possible to 
trace down whether people insisted in the concept of “work” per se, implying that they see 
work as a form of meaning, or whether they were more worried about the technical problem of 
survival’ (p. 11). 
 
1 More formally, one might point out that ‘work’ in their general sense is a genus with work in their narrow 
sense as one of its species. 
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Second, the paper provides an excellent backdrop for reflecting on a moral problem 
about work. Suppose it is in some sense possible that the most efficient way of securing ‘basic 
needs’ is by using technology alone – call this possibility an Ideal Supply Scenario (ISS). Such 
a scenario may not be very ‘realistic’ , but its theoretical possibility suggests that ‘basic needs’ 
can be conceptually divorced from ‘work as meaning’. Should human beings work in an ISS? 
An answer in the spirit of the paper is a resounding No, i.e., in an ISS, human beings should 
not do income-generating work. This answer should come as no surprise given the authors’ 
exclusion of ‘work as meaning’ from their answer to their title-question. However, this line of 
thought is implausible, since human beings have a need for meaning. In Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs, this need may be a part of the two levels above the ‘basic needs’ (belongingness and 
love needs, esteem needs), or it may be something broader that encompasses these. Either way, 
it is fundamental to human motivation (cf. Frankl 1953/1992; Meinertsen 2007), and it could 
aptly be called a ‘basic need’ in a context where this expression is not reserved for non-
meaning-related needs. This would not be a problem for Santos et al, save for the fact that 
human beings can only meet this need themselves. Part of what makes our lives ‘meaningful’ 
is that we, as agents, procure this meaning ourselves, as it were. To use again the general 
definition of work from Oxford Dictionaries cited above, meaning-generating work requires 
our ‘activity involving mental or physical effort done in order to achieve purpose or result’. 
Note that the claim here is not that ‘self-procurement’ is true by definition; only that its denial 
is very implausible.  
This brings to mind Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ (Nozick 1974). Nozick, in 
the course of investigating the nature of happiness, conducted his famous thought experiment 
about a machine that produces any happiness-inducing experience required by people who lie 
down in it, such as fame, fortune and ideal love, as well as the non-veridical experience that 
their experiences are of real events and not produced by a machine. Intuitively, a person in this 
machine is not happy. Analogously, it is highly implausible that any machine could satisfy our 
need for meaning. And, of course, for many of us meeting this need involves income-generating 
work. Consequently, unless human beings can satisfy their need for meaning in ways not 
including income-generating work, ISS poses a major ethical challenge: should we sacrifice 
(some of) our need for meaning in order to let technology do all the income-generating work?  
Now, this is a question that can only be dealt with properly if ethical considerations and 
the notion of meaning are involved at length, and as such it is beyond the (justified) scope of 
Santos et al’s paper. Nonetheless, it might seem that the second part of their surveys reflects a 
more concrete counterpart of the conundrum, so to speak: 
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If we found a way for machines to do all jobs…: 
[(1)] I would not mind as long as I had access to money. 
[(2)] I would not mind as long as I had access to whatever I need. 
[(3)] I would mind because I want to work. (p. 13) 
This is arguably not to the case, though: the sense of ‘whatever I need’ in (2) clearly seems to 
be a sense of need that excludes the need for meaning. Or, to put it alternatively, the antecedent 
of the survey question (‘If we found a way for machines to do all jobs’) expresses an ISS that 
does not include meaning in our ‘basic needs’. So, naturally, to many people the survey here 
presents a very attractive scenario. Indeed, 53% of the Facebook participants and 57% of the 
Harvard Graduates ones selected (2) as their answer. In contrast, arguably no one would select 
it if it were stated that it required that they could not meet their need for meaning. Or perhaps 
someone would? Whether or not they would, should they? These are questions that future 
research might fruitfully address. A grumpy reader of the paper might complain that, for all its 
(justified) focus on income-generating work, it ought not to have had a title that forces us to 
ask these questions without at least acknowledging them. On the other hand, it is a great virtue 
of the paper that it brings this issue to the fore.2 
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